




Experience with LHC Beam Loss Monitoring system (and lessons for FAIR)



Mariusz Sapinski (LOAO) FAIR Commissioning and Control WG GSI, November 18th, 2015








- 1. Motivation : LHC beam and machine protection
- 2. System specification
- 3. Reliability
- 4. Choice of detector technology
- 5. Electronics
- 6. Data definition and flow
- 7. Loss examples (injection losses, UFOs)
- 8. Beam-abort thresholds
- 9. New developments

Motivation: LHC beam





250 MJ/beam

(a few weeks ago)


wikipedia.org: 1 *MJ is approximately the kinetic energy of a one-tonne vehicle moving at 160 km/h*

SIS-100: only 100 kJ (p)


- pulsing machine, loss-generating processes repeat regularly

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🖬 🚍 🏛 Motivation: loss consequences




December 5, 2003, 1.5 MJ beam lost on the aperture in TeVatron, causing massive quenches and damage of the vacuum chamber and collimators – 2 weeks to repair.



🕞 🚍 🏛 Machine protection: redundancy



Protection scheme against beam losses in superconducting magnets. LOSS DURATION PROTECTION SYSTEM



+ other systems (about 20) which can trigger interlock and dump the beam

BLM system has 2 functions: protection and diagnostics (measurement).

the two roles have different requirements! - compromises

Beam losses are regular (controlled, slow) and irregular (uncontrolled). Examples of irregular losses:

- Obstacles and falling objects (UFOs)
- Orbit changes (for instance due to magnet current error)
- Wrong collimators setting
- Wrong tune
- Beam instabilities ...

Irregular losses may result in:

- Quenching superconducting magnet
- Unnecessary activation of accelerator elements and environment
- Single Event Upsets in tunnel electronics
- Damage of vacuum chamber



System parameters



The most important BLM system parameters:

- Sensitivity m
- Dynamic range m/p
- Response time and temporal resolution
- Spatial resolution m
- Reliability
 - р
- Radiation hardness
 - \mathbf{n}




System specification



Main document dates 2004, but based on previous studies. (LSA structures were specified in 2007)

Key parameters:

- Sensitivity: 5% of quench level
- Dynamic range: about 10^5 for signal integration time 40 μ s
- Response time ≤ 1 turn (0.1 ms)
- <u>Failure rate (reliability):</u>






BLM sanity check



Check which runs before every fill: <u>Connectivity check</u> Detects non-conformities of cabling, verify HV, can detect issues in the tunnel electronics. (J. Emery, J. Instrum. 5 (2010) C12044)

Internal beam permit check

Verify ability of every threshold comparator to send beam dump request.





Detector choice (I)






Ionization chamber

(similar to the one used in SPS) Stainless steal cylinder Parallel electrodes distance 0.5 cm (Aluminium) Diameter 8.9 cm Voltage 1.5 kV Low pass filter at the HV input Length 60 cm N_2 gas filling at 1.1 bar Sensitive volume 1.5 l




Initial choice for high-rad areas: Secondary Emission Monitor (SEM)





Detector choice (II)





Well known and reliable component (SPS ionization chambers are in use since 30 years)

1111111

10⁶



Electronics

opt. Fibre

Laser

Laser

Photo diode

Photo diode




to BIC

(Dump)

Signal

combiner

Safe beam flag



Current to Frequency Converters (CFCs) Tunnel FPGAs: Actel's 54SX/A radiation tolerant. **Communication links: Gigabit Optical Links.**

Real-Time Processing BEE

FPGA Altera's Stratix EP1S40 Mezzanine card for the optical links 3 x 2 MB SRAMs for temporary data storage NV-RAM for system settings and threshold table storage

FPGA

Signal check

Comparator

Signal check

Comparator

VME bus Beam energy

Beam permit

- masking

Threshold

Threshold

Synchronize

Demultiplxer

Synchronizer

Demultiplxer

Decoder

Electronics in surface building

Decoder





Signal is integrated in 40 μ s time window (25 kHz samplig).

The 40 μ s time windows are assembled into 12 running sums: 40 μ s, 80 μ s, 320 μ s, 640 μ s, 2.56 ms, 10.24 ms, 81.92 ms, 0.655 s, 1.31 s, 5.24 s. 20.97 s, 83.89 s.

The 12 running sums are compared with 12 thresholds in FPGA.


All data cannot be archieved! Data are logged in LHC Logging DB with initial frequency of 1 Hz, further reduced after 1 week for permanent storage.

In addition there are special buffers (PostMortem, Study) which store a given number of $40 \ \mu s$ time windows and which can be recovered under special conditions (eg. beam dump).




Data diagram





Loss example (I): collimation






🖬 🚍 🏛 🛛 Loss example (II): quadrupole

F((IR

irregular loss (eg. due to orbit distortion)



Particles first lost in places with a large β-function and/or dispersion: quadrupoles and dispersion suppressor. During Run I this loss scenario turned out to be irrelevant! Every 3rd detector was moved to another location.

Loss example (III): massive quench at injection



Quench of 4 dipole magnets at injection due to wrong current in MQ magnets. Injected one bunch of 8E9 protons.




Image: Image: Image: Second Action of the second and the second action of the second actio



Loss at overinjection

The

LHC

Beam Loss Monitoring system - FC2WG, GSI 2015.11.18

IP2 injection region superimposed on IP8 10 lets MBX TD BLMs thresholds **10⁻²** signals in BLMs on beam 1 ignals in BLMs on beam 2 superimposed signal IP2, beam 1 **10⁻³** superimposed signal IP2, beam 2 23340 23360 23380 23400 dcum [m] IP8 and IP2 asymmetry chicane in IP8 at overinjection






Loss example (V): UFOs




UFOs are sudden losses lasting about 0.5-2 ms.

Sometimes they dump the beam (exceeding BLM thresholds).

Post Mortem data of the first UFO which dumped the LHC beam








E = II Loss example (V): millisecond quench test

- Goal: measure steady-state quench level for UFO-type loss.
- Superconducting machine not easy to generate beam loss in millisecond timescale (wire scanner test in 2010).
- Help comes from transverse damper fast magnet with programmable feedback loop,
- Beam intensity below pilot bunch.



Preparation: additional BLMs



MQ_{N+1}

MQ_{N+2}

MQ

MQ_{N-1}


MQ_{N-2}

🖙 🚍 🗴 🛛 Beam-abort thresholds (I)



The beam should be stopped when:

- Loss level is close to quench level of superconducting magnet
- Loss level is close to damage of accelerator element
- Loss level is abnormally high, showing some problems with settings (for instance collimation hierarchy breaking).




LHC: most thresholds driven by quench prevention

Quench impact – long recovery (up to 5 hours) In Tevatron it was worst – refilling antiprotons

Nice surprise: almost no quenches in LHC:

- good orbit stability
- large stability margin

Beam-abort thresholds (II)








<u>Warm magnets</u> – conditions to compute thresholds:

- short loss: should not be damaged
- long loss: should not be overheated (about 100 C)

Collimators:

thresholds typically far from damage level, determined by assumed beam lifetime and hierarchy.






New developments (I)



New detectors:


- Little ionization chamber (with lower gas pressure) lower sensitivity
- Fast diamond detectors bunch-by-bunch measurements



New developments (II)



Idea: put BLM detectors closer to magnet coil.



The same readout electronics as standard system.

Better sensitivity to beam losses (less material in front)

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- 1. BLM system is critical for safety of LHC machine.
- 2. It plays a crucial role in beam diagnostics.
- 3. Complex but very reliable system (no spurious beam dumps).
- 4. Developments ongoing: CryoBLM, Cerenkov fibers, etc...

Summary

For FAIR:

- •. Complex data definition and flow.
- •. Some loss scenarios turned out irrelevant (but we would not know it without BLM system).
- •. Unexpected loss scenarios appeared...

Thank you for your attention!



Additional slides






Limitations



Example: debris from ATLAS and slow beam losses in the triplet:

In order to protect Q2 magnet the threshold for slow losses should be set very close to constant debris signal. Spurious beam dumps would be unavoidable.


Similar problem of radiation masking signal from dangerous beam loss is observed in other locations on LHC.



🖬 🚍 🏛 🛛 Beam-abort thresholds (III)



One of the most spectacular quench tests: generate millisecond scale losses using with Wire Scanner at 3.5 TeV. Motivation: explore quench limit for losses similar to UFOs. Quench occurred after about 10 ms




LHC Detector choice (III)



The LHC Beam Loss Monitoring system - FC2WG, GSI 2015.11.18

Frequency distribution



SPS BLMs

current [pA]

Total received dose: ring 0.1 to 1 kGy/year extr 0.1 to 10 MGy/year

30 years of operation

Measurements done with installed electronic

- 140 Relative accuracy
 - $-\Delta\sigma/\sigma$ < 0.01 (for ring BLMs)
 - $-\Delta\sigma/\sigma$ < 0.05 (for Extr., inj. BLMs)

Gain variation only observed in high radiation areas

Consequences for LHC:

- No gain variation expected in the straight section and ARC of LHC
- Variation of gain in collimation possible for ionisation chambers

Reliable component